

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: IDEOLOGY
AS ITS STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY.**

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ABSTRACT

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The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 stated that defending the Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government and that the primary threat is from terrorists. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is a test of our national will and one that requires the employment of all the nation's instruments of power. However before we can employ instruments of power against an enemy, it must be determined clearly against what sources of their strength and weakness are we directing our power. We must be certain that we are targeting that one critical source of strength, their strategic center of gravity.

The NSS states that the GWOT is against a politically motivated network of terrorists with global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. This means that unlike prior enemies, there is no clear state for the U.S to direct its national powers against, but instead a loose organization of groups. Without a clear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups, their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power, there exists a possibility that our national power employment efforts may be misdirected, marginalized, or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy is silent on this unifying power issue, it leaves the components of the federal government to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic, operational, and tactical level. This lends itself to misdirection if diverse and conflicting centers of gravity are determined but not coordinated by U.S elements.

The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first, to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second, to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third, to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth, to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gravity.

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THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: IDEOLOGY AS ITS STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY

An analysis of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) focuses attention on the evidence that religious ideology is a theme that permeates the methodology, justification, and rhetoric of al-Qaeda, other global terrorist organizations and their supporters. The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 however, states that the war is against politically motivated terrorists of global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology.¹ This means that unlike prior enemies, there is no clear state for the U.S to direct its national powers against, but instead a loose organization of groups. Groups that purportedly have political ends to achieve, but groups that do not use political methods to achieve those ends. They instead resort to terrorism as a method against states, strong and otherwise, that they feel have oppressed and marginalized them. These groups are not using political, military or economic methods, but a continuing flow of recruits to execute terrorism. To attain their goals, political or religious, they must have some unifying source that sustains them. Simple hatred is too diverse and susceptible to diffusion, besides it is a symptom, not a source. However, history has shown that ideology can be utilized to feed, control and focus hatred.

Without a clear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups, their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power, there exists a larger degree of possibility that any national power employment efforts maybe misdirected, marginalized or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy on terrorism is silent on this unifying power issue, it leaves the components to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic, operational and tactical level.

The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first, to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second, to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third, to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth, to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gravity.

A REVIEW OF THE CENTER OF GRAVITY CONCEPT

The first task then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.²

—Clausewitz

Since Karl von Clausewitz formalized the center of gravity (COG) concept in his book On War, military planners have used it as a doctrinal focal point. Clausewitz saw war as “merely the continuation of a (nation's) policy by other means,” and “an act of force to compel our enemy

to do our will.³ National policymakers must take the concept of COG(s) to heart during grand strategy formulation in determining the critical single source of the enemy's strength. I will argue that operational and tactical COG(s) have been substituted for the strategic COG during the selection and employment of national power elements in the GWOT. This has resulted in less effective national power employment efforts.

A condensed review of the center of gravity concept is useful. Since its introduction by Clausewitz, the COG theory has not been static in either theory or application. For instance, Clausewitz did not distinguish among tactical, operational or strategic COGs, but they exist. Clausewitz's theory was based on his observations of what were then conventional European conflicts and the focusing of military power on a few key centers. These included the army, the capital city, alliances and the leadership. As the industrial revolution developed, a nation's industrial capability became a potential center of gravity.

Giulio Douhet, a twentieth-century Italian theorist, added elements to the centers of gravity debate. When the psychological component is considered it is clear that no iron clad and rigid process for identifying centers of gravity can be produced. It is possible, however, to derive general rules of thumb and guidelines.⁴

Douhet therefore proposed two new centers of gravity, population centers and the enemy's air force. He felt that if one's air force could attack and degrade these two opposition centers severely enough, one would demoralize the enemy and cause a collapse of the enemy. Douhet's expansion of the population center and its psychological component as a COG is valuable and valid.

Later, Colonel John A. Warden III, USAF wrote,

Two different conceptions of centers of gravity exist. One approach identifies centers of gravity solely within the enemy's armed force. The second approach admits that the enemy's armed force is the most tangible center of gravity and the easiest to identify, but that other possible centers of gravity exist which contribute to the ability of this force to pursue the war.⁵

Warden recognized that different states or organizations (i.e. military or terrorist networks) have unique COGs specific to them. He acknowledged that:

The COG concept is simple in concept but difficult in execution because of the likelihood that more than one center will exist at anytime and that each center will have an effect of some kind on the others.⁶

Warden diverges from Clausewitz in that he allows for multiple centers of gravity at each level. Later studies, particularly by Dr. Joe Strange argue that Warden's COGs were actually critical capabilities that supported a COG.

COGs can be different from one military campaign to another when separated by time and circumstances. It has been accepted by the U.S. Army that during Desert Storm the Iraqi Republican Guard was the COG for that campaign.⁷ The Republican Guard however, was not declared the COG for Operation Iraqi Freedom. An initial analysis of the enemy's operational and tactical centers of gravity requires constant reappraisal during both planning and execution. It may develop or change during the course of the campaign or war.

Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning describes COGs as:

Those aspects of the adversary's overall capability that, theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will lead either to the adversary's inevitable defeat or force opponents to abandon aims or change behavior.⁸

This definition can be applied to strategic, operational, and tactical COGs. Success against one level COG should have a direct impact on another level in a cascading effect. If the effect is non-existent, the target was incorrectly labeled as a COG. It is then acceptable to state that success against the strategic COG will end the war.

Antulio Echevarria differs in the approach to COGs than that of the Joint Pub 5-00.1, in that the Joint Publication is too capabilities based, whereas he believes Clausewitz's theory is effects based.⁹ The effects based approach has important and direct effect on the strategy for the GWOT. The selection of a center of gravity focuses clarity of purpose and empowers decisive thinking. Current military doctrine is clear on the failure to successfully identify and define the enemy's COG – your efforts to defeat your enemy will fail.¹⁰

COGs are not enemy weakness, vulnerabilities, or capabilities, but are in a way what Echevarria refers to as focal points where certain forces come together.¹¹ The convergence of focal points creates a structure, physical or not, that gives connectivity and unity to the enemy. Echevarria asserts that this structure is not a COG, the source of strength, but only a sense of balance. He states "a blow to the enemy's COG would throw him off balance or put differently, cause his entire system (or structure) to collapse."¹² The terrorist network is such a structure, which is given shape and balance by a COG that needs to be identified and attacked.

ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AS A CENTER OF GRAVITY

Ideology is a systematic body of concepts especially about human life and culture.¹³ There is reason to believe that Clausewitz would accept ideology as a COG, as an assessment of COGs will at some point lead to the "remarkable trinity of war" articulated by Clausewitz. The three elements of the trinity that he describes are: primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the

play of chance, friction, and probability; and an instrument of policy which is subject to reason alone. Clausewitz then connects each with sets of human sectors: the people with hatred and enmity; the army with friction, chance, and probability; and the government for whom policy should be driven by reason, hence "war is an instrument of policy." The will of the people is paramount, followed by the political leadership and lastly military capability.¹⁴ History has repeatedly shown that the will of the people is subject to psychological influence, and can be manipulated to use its primordial violence and hatred for the cause of the state or its ideology.

Wars on political ideologies have normally required a state to counter, examples being fascism with Germany and Italy, or countering the spread of communism by containing and countering the actions and efforts of the Soviet Union, and its satellite states. As the full range of U.S. national power could be applied against those states, it therefore was applied against fascism or communism. Communism, as originally defined by Marxian socialism, was utilized to mobilize the proletariat class against the privileged class. Utilized by Lenin and Stalin it was a totalitarian tool of a new privileged class of government officials, and focused against those for whom communism was intended to aid, the working class. Ideologies create a new privileged class.

Fascism started as a mass movement to mobilized Italians and Germans against the hardships after World War I through a mixture of socialism and nationalism. After German fascism had molded itself with racist hatred into Nazism, core militant and radical groups became willing to use violence focused against opposition groups sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions.

These ideologies seed and feed the frustration and despair of the poor and working classes to develop and focus hatred against others, those that were not like them, (Jews and capitalists), and who, they were told were the true basis for their misery. The international community unwittingly allowed the fascists to grow strong, to develop a leadership structure and to raise an army.

It was the army and leadership that the West fought directly in World War II because of the strength that they have developed. Nevertheless, the fascist ideology nurtured the core believers and fed the disenfranchised. Ideology was the source of strength, but once institutionalized it had to be attacked through critical capabilities, the German and Italian armies. However, the hatred ideology needed to be eliminated for lasting victory.

IDEOLOGY - THE CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR TERRORISM

The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.¹⁵

—Clausewitz

The conclusion that ideology can be a center of gravity leads to the next step - is ideology the COG for the war on terrorism? This requires two issues to be addressed; what is terrorism, and what could be the strategic COG for terrorism? Potential COGs could be - their leadership, their military might, their infrastructure, or their ideology as an expression of the will of the people. First, however, the issue of defining terrorism.

TERRORISM

The NSS stated, "The enemy is terrorism - premeditated politically motivated violence."¹⁶ While the phrase of Global War on Terrorism is useful for speeches and simple framing, wars against symptoms or ways are rarely successful as the underlying causes are difficult to agree upon politically and are expensive to resolve.¹⁷ Terrorism is the psychological result of a terrorist act, an act driven by the symptom of deep hatred, a hatred that flows from a source that must be defined. The definition of terrorism is an issue worth attention, as terrorism is primarily aimed not at the victims, but at the people watching.

The need to have a standard definition of terrorism is important. There are organizations that use a definition of terrorism that suits their methods and missions in fighting terrorism.¹⁸ There are two definitions that deserve attention. The Department of Defense has the most comprehensive definition of terrorism and of particular note is the inclusion of religion and ideology in the nature of the terrorist goals:

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.¹⁹

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), a cornerstone document, defines terrorism as:

premeditated, politically motivated, violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.²⁰

There are three major flaws with the later definition. First is that statements from al-Qaeda, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar Mohammad, and most radical Islamist clerics is that armed action against the U.S. and its allies is a religious (not political) requirement for all

Muslims as the actions are part of a defensive armed jihad (struggle) to defend the Muslim umma (community). The second problem is that the adversary of the U.S., as defined by armed radical militant Islamists (jihadists), is not the some sub-national group or groups but the entire umma. Third, the NSCT definition does not address material support, such as the radical and militant Islamist clerics who advocate (threaten) in a material way the use of armed jihad against the U.S. These are parties that are materially involved (as much as those that finance or harbor terrorists), in the adversarial conflict and should be treated as such.

These critical aspects must be acknowledged if we are to effectively deal with terrorism and its center of gravity. Terrorism, and the ideology that spawned it, is effects based, therefore its definition should reflect that fact. A definition I put forth is that,

Terrorism is the threat or actual use of violence against parties not materially involved in the adversarial conflict for purposes of forcing your enemy to bend to your will.²¹

CENTERS OF GRAVITY FOR TERRORISM

The efforts receiving the most attention in the GWOT are those directed at the terrorist leadership. Whether this is in response to domestic political concerns or media fixation on Osama bin Laden and his capture, it is a response that is focused on a valid and visible but tactical COG.

There are influential policy makers and advisors such as Richard Perle and David Frum, who have unrealistic positions regarding terrorist operations. They write that if the Clinton Administration had taken the chance to arrest bin Laden when he was expelled from Sudan in 1996, the World Trade Towers' horror would not have occurred.²² This shows a naiveté about the working of terrorist cells and a lack of understanding that unlike a state dictator, the removal of a single leader, no matter how high in the chain, does not permanently stop operations, nor bring down the terrorist organization.

Evidence appears to indicate that the terrorist cells facing us today are far more independent, with decentralized authority and localized tactics and capabilities. This reduces their requirement for a centralized controlling element. Bin Laden and other terrorist leaders have put into practice many of the management and leadership strategies of current successful U.S. corporations. He decentralized decision-making authority, instituted a flat structure that could quickly respond to change. His use of the Internet and other telecommunication tools to communicate goals and an overarching sense of mission enable him to mobilize the force of the right people at the right time. This approach diminishes the need for bin Laden as a critical leader, and that probably was his intent.²³ It allows al-Qaeda to function without him and with or

without any number of other leaders. The terrorist leadership therefore is not a strategic or operational COG, as al-Qaeda will not abandon its arms due to the loss of bin Laden or any number of leaders. His abilities are a critical requirement but one that can be replaced.

Regarding the terrorists' military capability, the State Department lists 36 terrorist groups, 21 with a radical Islamist foundation. The armed strength estimates among those 21 groups is approximately 16,000, although that number is not static.²⁴ Clearly this force, especially without weapons of mass destruction, is not a military capability that could successfully engage the U.S. or any of several Western states. Additionally, even with the elimination of these forces, past history has shown those depleted forces have been replaced with new recruits, many from religious schools.²⁵ Therefore the destruction of their current forces will not cause the collapse of terrorism. Additionally, terrorist operations do not need armies, only the dedicated few. They are a critical capability, a tactical COG in certain situations, but not the strategic COG of terrorism. What motivates and empowers them is the strategic COG.

The infrastructure for terrorism includes the elements of training sites, safe haven, and funding that are supported by a complex web of actors that includes states, groups and individuals. The removal of any one of these elements or actors will not cripple terrorism, as in fact al-Qaeda has shown skill at reconstituting their infrastructure elements. As they lose sanctuaries, they can hide themselves within transnational communities as a remote base of operations, communicating via modern technology.²⁶ The use of our military power to significantly degrade these elements is not the answer as its limited in its ability.²⁷ Reducing sanctuaries and training facilities will adversely affect their planning and operations cycle, but will not force terrorist networks to collapse.

Al-Qaeda is probably the best financed terrorist network based on its diversification. Its financial apparatus is so broad and varied that it is unlikely that any one figure, to include bin Laden, has the complete picture. Al-Qaeda utilizes sophisticated financial transactions through multi-national banks to move money it receives from charities, private corporations it owns, shell companies and individuals.²⁸ The U.S. Government has acknowledged that it has no clear idea of how terrorist assets are moved and that the U.S. itself cannot fully implement the U.N. sanction policies it championed.²⁹ Merely because the funding of terrorism is efficient, does not mean that funding is the strategic source of strength for terrorism. Funding does not supply motivation for terrorists to act, but instead it provides a critical capability to their strength.

So, if leadership, military capability and economic infrastructure are not the strategic COG for the GWOT, what is? Dr. Strange offers this definition of a COG, they "are physical or moral entities that are the primary components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance.

They don't just contribute to strength, they ARE the strength."³⁰ To assist in this search, it may be helpful to determine what does the enemy think is our strategic COG.

Bin Laden and other terrorists have correctly identified that our center of gravity is not the military or the leadership, but the people's will. That is what terrorism attacks and against what we must defend.³¹ This same effects based assessment is valid for the terrorist networks. Their strength is derived from what they believe to be their umma's will, of what is right for the Muslim community. Salafis believe that their strict, non-pluralist ideology is the will of the umma. What needs to be determined is what means facilitated many radical Islamists to become jihadists?

The strong effects of the Gulf War on the radical Islamist movement may have been underestimated. To many in the radical Islamist movement the United States was the only power able to undermine Salafi Islam. The Soviet Union had collapsed, as they saw it by jihad, so its support of an Arab socialism threat to the Islamist movement was non-existent. However, the U.S. posed a threat, and it was massing troops in the "Holy Land" for war. Even though the Saudi government had obtained permission from the Ulama (highest religious council) to invite the non-Muslim troops, and despite the fact that the great majority left after the war, the mere presence of the troops created continuing problems. The Western presence, apparently emboldened modern Saudis to act and there were modernist protests for political reforms. These actions created a backlash by strict Wahhabi clerics who looked for a way to expel the Western Christian soldiers.³² The result was a religious establishment that was more vocal and critical of the Saudi government and the Western powers occupying the Holy Land. The more radical of the clerics spoke of the need for a defensive jihad against the U.S.

The vocal material support aspect of terrorism is an important issue. States must address the ideology of hatred being dispensed by religious leaders in their territory if the message is one that condones, allows or encourages violence against others. Ideology incitement does lead to violence. Richard Holbrooke noted that war in Yugoslavia occurred not because of ancient hatreds, but rather because the government in Belgrade all through the 1990s allowed and encouraged racist messages to be fed to Bosnian Serbs.³³

Why is their ideology of hatred and violence aimed at the U.S. and the West? What is also not answered is how did the terrorist networks unify and what was the enabling source. To see what motivates terrorists, Harold Vetter suggests that classifying terrorists is an important first step. There are various typologies; one yet simple typology breaks terrorists into crusaders, criminals, and crazies. The first, crusaders, covers the al-Qaedas of the world – attempting to achieve goals through violent means. They commit terror to persuade their

potential followers that their ideological cause is not hopeless, that armed jihad can destroy American power.³⁴ Others like Perle, Frum and Daniel Pipes argue that the crusader type feel that the despair of life, mixed with the medieval theology of Wahhabism and nationalist self-pity understandably translates into a fanatical hatred of everything un-Islamic.³⁵ The Bush administration has framed the terrorist war as a war against the American way of life, against modern western values that America represents. Yet, numerous entities disagree, often strongly, with U.S. positions, but do not resort to terrorist acts. Numerous groups exist in poverty and despair, yet they do not resort to terrorist acts.

There is yet another type, the pragmatic terrorist who has a political agenda, an objective end to ascend to power. They are in competition with other groups for ruling power over a particular area. The pragmatic uses terrorism because as they see it they have been denied access to other tools of power, political, economic or informational. As they are not the ruling power, they do not have military power so they must either create an army as done in Colombia³⁶ or use what they consider asymmetrical military power - terrorist acts. The truth is that they have been frustrated in their use of political and informational power by their native countries. These countries were authoritarian in nature, lacked pluralism, freedom of speech and press and hope. Authoritarian works against pluralism, it frames different views as opposing views that must be silenced.

The problem with radical Islamist thoughts and practices is that it is as totalitarian as the state regime it seeks to replace. It seeks to create an order wherein its proponents are the sole spokesmen of a vengeful and chauvinistic God. The radical Islamists looked for a reason for their failure beyond themselves, and often beyond the host government of the country for the "true source" of their oppressions. They saw it as modernization and its chief proponent the United States, another superpower to be defeated and armed jihad was again the method.³⁷

The correct question to ask then is why an uneducated Muslim, attending a radical Islamist school would accept the notion that Christian and Jews are the cause of their fate, when it is their daily knowledge that their own rulers are the oppressors. The Administration correctly stated that the War on Terrorism is not part of the clash of civilizations, as Bernard Lewis, Ralph Peters and Samuel Huntington would argue.³⁸ It is in fact a clash of ideologies about the origin and nature of Islamic ideas and thinking. It is a clash between tolerance and pluralism, against intolerance and hatred. It is a clash that the Muslim umma must resolve, hopefully with U.S. enlightened assistance.

RADICAL MILITANT ISLAM – THE UNIFYING IDEOLOGY FOR TERRORISM

Religious ideology is a theme that permeates the methodology, justification, and rhetoric of al-Qaeda, other global terrorist organizations, and their supporters. Violence due to radical religious ideology is not a new concept for Western states, but those that existed were mostly Christian based.³⁹ Past concerns of American officials regarding radical Islam were about whether Islam is a religious force, like Judaism or Christianity, which provides spiritual support for a very broad spectrum of Muslim People, or is Islam a transnational political force that can be molded and manipulated. Islam has been used in both ways, by Muslims for dealing with day-to-day family and personal matters of Islamic law,⁴⁰ and by radical Islamists for justifying their bid for power. Not all radical Islamists are terrorists, who comprise only a fraction of the radical Islamist population.

This section will cover how radical militant Islam became the unifying ideology for terrorism by a review of the history of radical militant Islam and the role that education plays in the fostering of terrorism through hatred ideology.

HISTORY OF HATRED AND VIOLENCE

The current move towards modern Islamist action, (the politicalization of Islam), was fostered in the Middle East and was the result of the global trend towards modernization and the large changes that modernization brings. Authoritarian governments could not manage or contain these changes and had failed to prepare their people for change. The result was a lack of freedoms, lack of plurality with the resultant feelings by the people of despair, and the lack of hope. The West had supported many of these regimes during the Cold War for strategic reasons. When the Cold War ended, it was difficult to convince many authoritarian regimes to change, to embrace democracy and globalization. Those that did so did to a small extent and mostly in the global free trade area. How did much of the Muslim Arab world get to this point? The two major players in Arab development and the development of modern militant radical Islamists are Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their histories are intertwined.

The history of Saudi Arabia requires a review of the origins of Wahhabism. Muhaddad ibn Abdul Wahhab the founder of Wahhabism was born some time around 1700. While studying in central Arabia to be a qadi (religious judge), Ibn Abdul Wahhab became influenced by the writings by Ibn Taymiyya, a 14th century writer, who argued that the foreign influence of Christianity and Judaism on Islam was evil and that jihad against all non-Muslim infidels was the highest religious act one could perform. Ibn Wahhab saw foreign influence in the Arabia peninsula in the 18th century, and was determined to eliminate it, however, his power was

limited. This changed in 1744 when he struck a political deal with Muhammad Ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah. Ibn Wahhab saw a military power to help him spread Wahhabism and Ibn Saud saw a religious method, jihad, to help him expand the Saudi rule over Bedouin tribes.⁴¹

The Wahhabi version of Islam was radical as it broke with Sunni tradition of respecting other Sunni schools of Islamic Law.⁴² Ibn Saud and Ibn Wahhab declared that those that failed to accept Wahhabism were disbelievers and polytheists and it was permissible under Islam to kill them and confiscate their possessions. Ibn Saud and Ibn Wahhab created a religious justification to attack other Muslims, to own their property and a religious incentive to offer their warriors who fought for them. If you fight and live, earthly possessions; if you die, entrance into paradise, as you are a holy warrior.⁴³

The Wahhabi forces were brutal in their fighting, accepting no prisoners and executing women and children. By 1802, the Wahhabi forces under the Al-Saud family controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula. This was short lived, as the Ottoman Empire and its Egyptian army responded to what they considered the Wahhabi political and military threat. Their military power ended the first House of Saud in 1818. Most of the Muslim World rejoiced in the victory of moderate Muslims over the radical, something that should be remembered in today's world.⁴⁴

It is the third and modern House of Saud that spread Wahhabism throughout the world. Ibn Saud, like his ancestor, utilized a revived Wahhabi creed to consolidate his power. The modern Wahhabi warriors, called the Ikhwan, were as brutal and successful as their 18th century counterparts. In December 1924, following the Saudi-Hasemite War, the Al-Saud family were rulers of Arabia. Once again there was an adverse reaction from the Muslim world. In this case Ibn Saud proved more politically astute than his ancestor. When his efforts to minimize the growing power of the Wahhabi movement put him at war with the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud made a pact with the British (becoming their puppet in the eyes of some) and together they crushed the Ikhwan army. But the ideology of Wahhabism survived.

Ibn Saud realized he would never eliminate the Wahhabi movement so he chose to co-opt it. He stated that for Arabs there are two forming characteristics, Arabism and Islam. He felt that there are too many primitive and ignorant Arab people to understand Arabism and to form a nation.⁴⁵ However, Islam is something capable of being a basis on which to unify a nation. The Al-Saud chose to commence a difficult balancing undertaking between Western influence and an Islamic ideology. Wahhabism, a puritan non-pluralist Islamist ideology became the choice. It stayed mostly within the borders of Saudi Arabia until it saw a potential adversary.

A significant process that mobilized militant Islamic radicalism was the twentieth century rise of Pan Arabism under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser's Arab socialism was a clear threat to

Islam and certainly Wahhabism. In a twist of fate that is now coming back for us, the U.S. was the savior of Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism. Sayed Qutb, a former leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, stated that Saudi Arabia's efforts under King Faisal against Nasser's Arab nationalism could not have succeeded without the CIA. He commented that King Faisal needed help in promoting a Middle East Islamic character to counter Nasser Pan Arabism. The CIA was so successful that Qutb commented, "America made Islam."⁴⁶ The U.S. concerns were Soviet connections with Nasser and Arab socialism, and access to oil, not some Saudi religious ideology and its ally the Muslim Brotherhood. An Arab Cold War resulted between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt during 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as a charitable organization, became a powerful organization. It weaved traditional social ties with a modern organizational structure, where secrecy and a pyramidal command structure kept the members at the bottom unaware of the doings of the leaders, and the leadership protected from identification. The Brotherhood entered politics in the late 1930s to support the Arab Palestinians against Western (British) and Jewish activities. The Brotherhood grew in power as well as radicalism in espousing violence and was implicated in several assassinations. Starting in the mid 1950s, (it continued to an extent under Anwar Sadat), the pressure was such that much of the radical Muslim Brotherhood left Egypt for Saudi Arabia.

Two significant Egyptian radical Islamic thinkers that sought refuge in Saudi Arabia were Ayman al-Zawahiri (imprisoned in Egypt for his involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat), and Abdullah Azzam.⁴⁷ Zawahiri later became Osama bin Laden's deputy and al Qaeda's chief ideologue. Azzam became bin Laden's teacher at King Aziz University where Azzam became known as the Emir of Jihad. Azzam defended armed Jihad in the booklet, "Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Man's Most Important Duty." The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to Azzam a clear reason that required an armed defensive jihad, justified by Islam.⁴⁸ The Egyptian radical Al-Jihad founder and theorist Abd al-Salam Faraj (1952-1982) introduced a 7th century Kharajite theme of raising violent jihad to the status as a sixth pillar of Islam. In his pamphlet, "The Neglected Duty" he skirted several issues such as the harming of other Muslims.⁴⁹ It is useful to remember that the only religious movement that considers jihad as a sixth pillar was the break away movement of the Kharajites. It must be a critical element in the voice of the moderate movement that Salafi Wahhabism is a radical militant break away movement from the true path of Islam.⁵⁰

Dore Gold and Olivier Roy have opined that the partnership between Saudi Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood helped to further the radicalism of Islam. Saudi wealth to spread

that radicalism and the extent of the radicalism of Islam during the 1970s and 1980s was alarming.⁵¹ Gold writes of two books authorized by the Saudi government; “The Methods of the Ideological Invasion of the Islamic World”, and “The Facts that the Muslim must know about Christianity and Missionary Activity”. The main themes of the books according to Gold is that Islam and the secular West cannot co-exist and that Christians and Jews are no longer to be considered “People of the Book” as their modern practices converted their religions into paganism and polytheism. Not stated but implied was that as polytheists, Christians and Jews were now legitimate targets for attack.⁵²

The use of this jihadist ideology can be seen in a 2000 al-Qaeda recruitment video. It is telling of the issues that bin Laden believes he can use to call Muslims to arms. The first are the Christian and western troops in Dar al-Islam, the Holy Land. The video shows Muslims in prayer at various sights and then contrasts that with American tanks and soldiers on maneuvers in the Arabian Desert and women soldiers walking freely around. Next are scenes from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Palestinian women and children being mishandled and what Bin Laden calls the violation and dishonor of defenseless Muslim women. He reads a poem that chides the Muslim umma for not defending their brothers and sisters. Bin Laden speaks at length of how young Muslims show weakness by fearing death, and that their elders are more pious for they know that the afterlife is more important than this life.

He follows this section by advising that he knows the cure for what is wrong, the answer is armed Jihad. Their involvement in armed jihad will show they accept their responsibility to defend Islam and any Muslim under attack, and that if death should come it is a glorious death that will be rewarded.⁵³ As it does not suit his purposes, bin Laden ignores the wider accepted meaning of jihad.

EDUCATION – A TOOL FOR IDEOLOGY RECRUITMENT

Historically, privately run madrassahs (religious schools) were founded in order to teach the complexities of Islamic law to mature students. Unfortunately, due to the poor education performance of some states with Muslim populations, madrassahs have become the primary education for millions, and they did so along the Islamic law codes. Rote memorization of the Qur’an along with the interpretation of the school’s clerics is the learning format in many schools. Students have neither the background, nor the training and experience to question the cleric’s interpretation.⁵⁴

The mosque and its school remained a relatively independent institution in many Arab states, and therefore became an important center for expressing discontent, especially for the

unemployed and disenfranchised youth. This situation is a breeding ground for the radical militant Salafi ideology to take root.⁵⁵ The recruitment progress for Islamist terrorist groups focuses on this indoctrination ingredient. The complexity of the Islamic law is what allows it to be distorted by the likes of bin Laden and other radical militant Islamists.

The Deobandi Wahhabi influenced creed, as determined by radical Pakistani madrassahs, was a major source of indoctrination for the Taliban. The Deobandi movement started in 1866 in the Indian town of Deoband, where its main learning center, the Darul Uloom, is located. The Darul Uloom teaches a very strict form of Islam allowing for few modern variations. The Deobandi unlike the Wahhabis do not proselytizing actively and do not fund madrassas in other countries. Most importantly, the Darul Uloom does not encourage its students to violently defend Islam and it blames the excess of the Taliban on the influence of Wahhabi influenced Pashtuns.⁵⁶ Key Taliban elements received religious instruction from Islamist Pakistani parties, mostly the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i- Islami (JUI) party. These madrassahs were also a great source of recruits for the Taliban. The JUI encouraged students to join the Taliban by declaring the Afghan struggle a jihad. Additional when the Taliban were in need of troops, Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar issued appeals to JUI seminaries for more recruits, which came in the thousands.⁵⁷ Pakistani madrassahs are therefore a fundamental link in the recruitment and training cycle. Many Afghan war-hardened militants returned to their home countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Egypt to conduct armed jihad.⁵⁸

Numerous members of the Egyptian, Saudi and Pakistani clergy have propagated anti-Jewish and anti-American positions. Many are outrageous such as the January 2002 speech of Abdallah Bin Matruk Al-Haddal, a cleric from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, stating that Bin Laden was not involved in the September 11 attacks and that a Jewish deception was at play.⁵⁹ Other important Saudi religious scholars continued to speak against the US, especially after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to destroy terrorist bases and remove the Taliban regime. The Saudi Ulama strongly advocated support to the Taliban. Sheikh Muhammad bin Jubair, a senior member of the Ulama, personally pushed the Saudi government to support the Taliban.⁶⁰

The funding of Wahhabi education by Saudi Arabia throughout the world must be scrutinized, as well as the context of the teaching. The Saudi government distributes textbooks to schools throughout the world, including the U.S. PBS's Frontline program aired a report in which it analyzed two Saudi Middle School textbooks authorized by the Ministry of Education. The text books, "Hadiths" and "Explanations of the Quran," have numerous citations relating that Muslims and Jews must fight, Jews and Christians are enemies of the Muslims, that Allah curses Jews and Christians and that Muslims must be victorious over them. The books make

numerous recommendations that jihad is a duty and contain passages exhorting the Mujahideen and their armed struggle. Additionally, an 11th grade religious textbook commentary from 1995 states that the believer “must show the infidels rudeness and violence and wage Jihad in the way of Allah without fear of the infidels..., or terror of their arms and numbers.”⁶¹

The impact of this religious hatred education will be long term, difficult to reverse, which means that corrective action must be comprehensive and credible. Credibility is something that the U.S. must earn through its words and actions. To defeat terrorism means containment and marginalization of the totalitarian ideology nurturing and unifying it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Realizing the limited expanse of this paper, recommendations are offered without full expansion.

There are things that the U.S. must do in the War on Terrorism to neutralize radical militant Islamist ideology:

1. Ensure that our efforts in the GWOT do not diminish our strengths.⁶²
2. Regain international support. Diplomacy should be the cornerstone of our strategy against terrorism. The effort to regain international support will require a more balanced use of our national powers. While this means a stronger diplomatic effort, it does not negate military power, because diplomacy not backed by military strength is ineffectual.⁶³ Power and diplomacy are not alternatives, they must go together.”⁶⁴
3. Make clear that states are responsible for the conditions that lead to or support terrorism, which includes permitting racist or totalitarian rhetoric.⁶⁵ However, the US must also change its approach to empower moderate action.⁶⁶
4. Destroy terrorists by all means necessary. The way to deal with the existing ones is through cooperative international law enforcement and intelligence efforts, economic strangulation and destroy them though military action if necessary. The way to stop the development and hence the flow of these jihadists is to neutralize the education system that produced them.⁶⁷
5. Support moderate and progressive Muslims, their political leaders and their efforts, but also especially religious leaders. This includes the robust assistance of their schools, and their efforts to expose radical militant clerics as liars and usurpers of Islam.⁶⁸
6. Improve our information formulation and distribution. Trust and credibility are indispensable for information operations.⁶⁹ The war in Iraq demonstrates the need to execute a successful perception management program at both the tactical and

- strategic levels.⁷⁰ Successful military or law enforcement actions and the future benefits they generate are diminished by both verbal and physical mistakes that damage credibility and seriously set back policy presentations. If the U.S. is to mount a successful information war against militant Islamic groups, political information operations geared to domestic constituents must be re-aligned with information release that is factual and productive in the war on terrorism.⁷¹
7. Support the expansion of media outlets in Muslim countries.⁷²

CONCLUSION

Today we see again the work of a small militant and radical core willing to use violence to achieve their end. In this case, the end is the founding of numerous Islamic states governed by a new privileged class and their totalitarian ideology. According to Gilles Kepel two events helped to radicalize these elements of the Islamist movement to militancy, the Iranian Revolution and the Mujahideen Resistance against the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, which gave rise to the Taliban and showed that armed struggle (jihad) could succeed in creating an Islamic state.⁷³ Added to this is the belief of many in the Muslim world that U.S. resolve in helping other nations is assailable. This is drawn from the experiences of Lebanon, the Shia uprising after the Gulf War, and Somalia.

As Quintan Wiktorowicz correctly points out:

such an enemy cannot be eradicated through military operations and law enforcement dragnets alone, since there are always others to take the place of the fallen. The violent true believer can only be stopped if the ideas that nurture violence and terrorism are discredited. Convince these who would join the terrorists that the ideas of violence are not the ideas of Islam, and the flow of future recruits may slow to a manageable trickle.⁷⁴

Effective law enforcement and intelligence operations can only occur with the aid of international law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Diplomacy is the conduit. It must be accepted that effective diplomacy occurs when backed by credible military and economic power, not the other way around. Effective U.S. policy in addressing the cause of terrorism, must address through informational education the failed policies that fostered the seeds of hopelessness that freed the Islamist terrorists. We must strongly support both moderate and progressive Muslims.⁷⁵

The interdependence of national powers should be obvious and they must be focused on the objective of the grand strategy. Strategically, the effective neutralization of the radical

militant Islamic ideology. Operationally, the disruption and destruction of terrorist networks with global reach and the termination of state support for terrorist.⁷⁶

The war against Islamist terrorists is a war against an ideology and its advocates, as difficult and dangerous a threat to our national security as were fascism and communism. It will take the same commitment and a similar approach of containment of ideology as we wear down its advocates to the point where their ideology support collapses under its own false legs. The effort requires more economic, diplomatic and intelligence/law enforcement cooperative effort than projected military power.

WORD COUNT=7225\

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 5.

² Karl von Clausewitz, *On War 1984*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595-596.

³ Ibid., 76.

⁴ Steven Metz and Fredrick Downey, "Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning," *Military Review* 4 (April 1988): 27-30.

⁵ Ibid., 24.

⁶ John A. Warden Col, USAF, "The Enemy as a System," *Airpower Journal* 9 (Spring 1995): 49. Warden diverges from Clausewitz in that he allows for multiple centers of gravity at each level. Later studies, particularly by Dr. Joe Strange argue that Warden's COGs were actually critical capabilities that supported a COG.

⁷ Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, G-7, June 1993). FM-100-5 reads in part, "Although not located in Kuwait, it was the source of power necessary for Iraq to hold that country. The destruction of the Republican Guard was seen as the center of gravity for achieving the strategic goal of removing the Iraqi forces from Kuwait."

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 January 2002), IX.

⁹ Antulio Echevarria II., *Reigning in Center of Gravity* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Sep 2002), 5. Echevarria argues that the Joint Publication 5-00.1 definition is too capabilities oriented. He opines that the work of Dr. Joe Strange in determining between critical capabilities and critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities influenced the direction of the publication.

¹⁰ Joint Pub 5-00.1.

¹¹ Echevarria II., 2.

¹² Ibid, 6. Also, see Christopher Fowler, *Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, April 2002), 2.

¹³ Webster's Dictionary, (1988).

¹⁴ Clausewitz, This is a very basic review of the complex rationale behind the "remarkable trinity." Nevertheless, it is accurate in its simplistic level.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Bush, 5.

¹⁷ I offer the War on Poverty, the War on Drugs and the War on Crime respectively. The efforts in these “wars” were against the symptom, defined by a particular method or way and not in any comprehensive or successful manner against the underlying sources of the problem.

¹⁸ Department of Justice, FBI National Security Division, *Report on Terrorism in the United States 1995* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice 1996), appendix. The Department of Justice definition of terrorism is: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” Note there is no mention of a perpetrator or group.

Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999* (Washington, D.C. U.S. State Department, April 2000). The State Department uses the terrorism definition in Title 22 of the U.S. Code: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agent usually intended to influence an audience.” Note that the perpetrator is a sub national group or actor, not a state.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, *U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 1998), 452.

²⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 11.

²¹ For illustration purposes, it would have been lawful and useful to assassinate Hitler but not a woman whose function was to be his mistress regardless of any argument that she gave him comfort. Condoning that type of violence is to indirectly support al-Qaeda’s claim, that the individuals in the World Trade Towers were not innocents, but actually parties to the adversarial conflict because they paid taxes which the US Government used in part to fund actions against Muslims. Neither of the parties as framed above was materially involved in the adversarial conflict, as they did not affect policy or strategy.

²² David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil* (New York: Random House, 2003), 35.

²³ Peter J. Bergen, *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), 20, and Chapter 10. Also, see Giles Keppel, *Jihad, and the Trail of the Political Islamism*. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), and Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).

²⁴ Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 2002* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 2003), appendix. These figures are not static, as for example organizations such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a group of several thousand fighters located in Iraq, will have been adversely impacted by OIF. Other terrorist organizations will gain recruits because of OIF.

²⁵ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 2001), 113. Goodson thoroughly covers the connection between religious schools and the recruits for the Taliban. Also, see Daniel Byman, “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” *The National Interest*, (Summer 2003), 79–80, regarding the reconstitution abilities of Islamist terrorist groups. Additionally, it is enlightening to see the Secretary of Defense’s prospective on recruitment of terrorists. He stated, “To win the

war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas – the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited by terrorist networks across the globe. It is critical that our country recognize that the war on terrorism will be long, difficult and dangerous – and that as we deal with immediate terrorist threats, we also need to find ways to stop the next generation of terrorists from forming. For every terrorist whom coalition forces capture, kill, dissuade or deter, others are being trained.” Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Editorial,” *Washington Post* 26 October 2003, p23.

²⁶ James M. Smith and William Thomas, “The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors,” *USAF Institute for National Security Studies* (March 2001), 3-11. Additionally, the denying of sanctuaries to terrorists, is something that must be addressed but with the reality that it will be difficult and a long-term problem. An example is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in western Pakistan. The tribes in the FATA who have traditionally been permitted to rule themselves by tribal laws have varying agendas and loyalties, which complicate the situation. The U.S. must realize the complexity of the issue for Pakistan and support Pakistan in a reasonable and firm manner dictated by actions on the ground and not domestic U.S. policy.

²⁷ Washington Post Staff. “General Warns of Pakistani, Saudi Extremists” *Washington Post*, 30 January 2004. p 15. In addition to military power, the U.S. has spent considerable effort to disrupt the financing and training camps of radical Islamic terrorists, but it has done little to address the power that radical Islamic terrorists used most effectively, communication. The NSCT acknowledges the communication skills bin Laden and al-Qaeda has effectively utilized to advance their cause. Where is the U.S. expertise or strategic way to counter this effort? Besides a condemnation of bin Laden’s call for Muslims to do their “religious duty” and acquire WMD, where was the concerted effort by the U.S. to address how this call was contrary to the teaching of the Qur’an and other aspects of Islamic law. Condemnation alone by the U.S. is a weak one-dimension message.

²⁸ Kurt Eichenwald, “Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find.” *New York Times*, 10 December 2001; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2001/e20011210money.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2004. A hawala, which is part of the traditional but informal method of money transfer in the Middle East, permits the movement of large sums of money without a paper trail.

²⁹ Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda’s Finances Ample, Say Probers.” *Washington Post*, 14 December 2003 sec. A1, A28. The article highlights that the General Accounting Office found that law enforcement agencies agree that they are unable to fully track terrorist funds that flow from and through the U.S. GAO estimates that of the \$138 million that was seized, \$75 million belonged to the Taliban regime, and the balance was mostly from 272 individuals. GAO believes that the \$63 million seized from individuals is only a small fraction of the funds that exist. Also reviewed were the activities of the al Haramain Charitable Foundation of Saudi Arabia which, it was estimated, raised approximately \$30 million per year over many years for terrorist connected organizations. The Saudi government has closed several branches of the charity however others are still open.

Also, for results and challenges of asset tracking and seizure, see U.S. Senate, “*The Report to the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate, 24 July 2003).

³⁰ Joe Strange, *Perspectives on War Fighting*, No.4: *Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996), 14.

³¹ Peter Bergen, *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York, Free Press, 2001), 132-142.

In addition Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of the Political Islamism* . (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 317-320, and Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us*. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2003.

³² Dore Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003), 161-167. Gold writes at length about the negative consequences for Americans and moderate Saudis of American involvement in the 1991 Gulf War. He states that none were targeted more, by strict militant forces, then moderate clerics and women. For instances hundreds of women began to drive and forty-seven Saudi women were arrested for driving cars in violation of Saudi Islamic law. In addition, see Kepel, 209-210.

³³ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 22-24.

³⁴ Harold T. Vetter, *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991), 22. The crazies are the mentally disturbed, (represented by the Unabomber - Ted Kaczynski) an extremely small population of terrorists. The criminal element is organized crime.

³⁵ Frum and Perle, 9, 161. Also see Daniel Pipes and Graham Fuller, "Combating the Ideology of Radical Islam," *Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (10 April 2003): 48-60.

However, there is a danger in linking the image of the "New Warrior Class" as described by Ralph Peters, and the hard-core jihadists. The former are persons of opportunity who by banding together in an armed manner, under some banner (religious or otherwise) have the illusion of temporary power. As the poor conditions under which they live change their ranks will diminish rather quickly. The jihadists (armed radical militant) however, will not be deterred or placated by improving economic conditions. Theirs is a religious calling, motivated by ideology.

³⁶ The Colombian terrorist groups, the FARC and the ELN, started as Marxist insurgents in the 1960s, who over the years have turned into narco-terrorists. Their ideology gave way to the greed fostered by their involvement in the drug trade, which started to fund their insurgency. However, unlike al-Qaeda, they never sought separation from large segments of the population, as their goals were pluralist and political in nature. The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by speakers participating in a USAWC Regional Strategic Assessment series.

³⁷ Gold, 89-103, 172, 186. He discusses at length the Middle East problems of dealing with modernity and the transformation of their societies under corrupt and repressive regimes, which had not been solved by past attempts at Arab Nationalism or Socialism. Western democratic political approaches and economic reform have failed due to the expectation of both sides for quick results. This led to economic upheaval for which the regimes blamed Western Imperialism. Militant radical Islamists offer themselves up as the only force capable to do something about Western Imperialism. They utilize an interpretation of the Islamic teaching to state that Christianity and Judaism, the basis of Western Civilization, are flawed and only the pure approach to Islam can save the Muslim masses. Also of note is that as the authoritarian works against pluralism, the same approach is taken by radical Islamists, "submission to my

(way) view of Islam or perish. In addition, see Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of the Political Islamism*. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 161-181.

³⁸ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990): 47-60. Also see Ralph Peters, "Rolling Back Radical Islam," *Parameters* (Autumn 2002): 6., and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* (1993): 22-49. The "clash" as discussed by the cited authors is between the "House of Islam" and the "House of War" (or House of Unbelief). However, a fault in their argument is that contrary to the authors' views, the idea that there is a monolithic transnational entity, religious or political, called the civilization of Islam is simply contrary to the facts. While there are two main branches of Islam, Sunni (85% of the 1 billion Muslims) and Shi'i (mostly in Iran), there are 70 major communities that have broken away. Only 15% of Muslims live in the Middle East, China has 50 million Muslims and 45% live in South Asia. Like other religions, Islam has been subject to growth, development, adaptation and change. Most importantly, the current radical Islamic approach is a throwback to the 7th and 9th centuries and is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims.

³⁹ The Roman Catholic Church used Inquisitions (first in 1231 by Pope Gregory IX and the second in 1478 authorized by Pope Sixtus IV for King Ferdinand V and Queen Isabella - hence the name Spanish Inquisition), focused against those proposing an alternate path to salvation. There are similarities between the views of Pope Gregory and strict Islamist clerics in that he believed that non-believers must be given an opportunity to see the error of their ways, repent and return to the true path before punishment. Hence the trial or inquisition. Second, that the non-believer threatens the social order, the privileged place that the religious authorities held, and their relationship with the power of the State. See "The Middle Ages – The Inquisition" *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VIII, (New York: Appleton Company 2003), Section IV.

⁴⁰ Farhad Daftary, *Intellectual Traditions in Islam* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishing, 2001), chapter 4. The incorrect term of Islamic fundamentalism is upsetting to many Muslims. Fundamentalism was normally applied to those Christians who took the Bible as a literal scripture. Islamic Muslims have always done so with the Qur'an. Therefore, to describe a terrorist act as having been committed by Islamic fundamentalists insults and incorrectly mislabels many Muslims. It is also a counter-productive message when used by the U.S. Government or U.S. media, as the message will be lost due to insult and anger. U.S. policy must articulate the ways in which we deal with the clear difference between a militant or radical Islamist and a terrorist using the guise of Islam and Islamic Law. Islamic Law is based on four sources, the most important being the Qur'an, the writing and deeds of Muhammad (hadiths), the consensus of the community (ijima) and analogical reasoning (qiyas).

⁴¹ Jihad means struggle or exertion and applies to physical or moral struggle and could mean the effort to control one's temper or to quit smoking. It is a highly nuanced concept that in no way denotes the term use of "Holy War." Qur'an (2:217) permits physical action to fight aggression or to support the struggle for justice, but outlines strict guidelines for use of violence. Al-Qaeda has violated many of these guidelines, such as attacking innocent persons.

Note - the central part of Arabia known as the Najd was ruled by tribal families like Al-Saud.

⁴² Joshua Teitelbaum, *Holier Than Thou. Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy Publishing, 2000): 60-62. Also, see Gold, 22. Of note-, Ibn Abdul Wahhab created a version of the Hanbal school that labeled the other schools; Hanafi, Malaki, and Shafil, as well as the Shia school, as schools of unbelievers.

⁴³ According to Islamic tradition, a warrior who gives his life in a true jihad, translated into meaning holy war, becomes a martyr (shahid), who is guaranteed entry into paradise. This was particularly true during the 7th century. However, an important process occurred during the 9th century, Muslim scholars broadened the meaning of jihad (literally-struggle) to emphasize a personal internal struggle. Therefore, for tens of millions of Muslims, jihad is a personal struggle of self-improvement. Additionally, the Islamic Sufism tradition added a mystic aspect to jihad and Islam. Mainstream Islam moved away from the militant interpretation of jihad, to the point that someone who effectively spread the word of God and his messenger (Muhammad) could be considered a shahid.

⁴⁴ Gold, 22 –34. Note, the second House of Saud under Faisal recovered some influence in the mid 19th century, but it collapsed upon his death in 1865.

⁴⁵ F.H.W. Bird, "Account of Interview of King Ibn Saud," *United Kingdom Public Record Office* FO 371/35417E 140/09/25, (7 Jan 1943).

⁴⁶ Said Aburish, *The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 131, 158-161.

⁴⁷ Gold, 94. Gold discusses that Azzam and al-Zawahiri broke with the founding nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, by using armed jihad under the guise of Islam for personal purposes. The Brotherhood, which started in the 1920s with welfare activities by promoting a revitalization of Islam and had grown over five decades into a political struggle against Colonialism.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 96.

⁴⁹ It is important to note and publish that many people killed or injured in terrorist attacks are Muslims. The November 3, 2003 bombing in Istanbul, Turkey killed twenty, most of them Muslims. Attacks in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and at the embassies in Africa also killed many Muslims.

⁵⁰ Gold, 7,25. Gold discusses that most of the Muslim community accepts five pillars of Islam: accepting oneness of God and spreading the word of God and his messenger, prayer; charity or Zakat, Ramadan fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, there remained a small element within the Muslim community that continued with the concept of the militant jihad. The Kharajtes left the Islamic mainstream in the 7th century and elevated jihad to a sixth pillar of Islam. Their influence remained limited until the 18th century, when the Wahhabi movement restored the armed militant nature to jihad. Sheikh al-Shunibi, Sheikh Jibrin and Sheikh Hamzeh al-Ghazani spoke that the use of the word terrorism by Western government is actually the terror they feel as cowards and is applied in accordance with the law of Allah as jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam.

⁵¹ Ibid. 89-103, 215-218, 227, in which he discusses that the government of Saudi Arabia has made some efforts to control the terrorist groups that operate from and which are financed by organizations within Saudi Arabia. However, the history of Saudi Arabia and the ideology of Wahhabism as being interwoven is a fact. Institutional support for radical Islam has been so pervasive and sustained within Saudi Arabia for at least the last fifty years that the ability of those in the Saudi regime to influence a moderate approach is currently limited.

⁵² Ibid. 101-103.

⁵³ Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 174-183.

According to Islamic tradition, a warrior who gives his life in a true jihad, translated into meaning holy war, becomes a martyr (shahid), who is guaranteed entry into paradise. This was particularly true during the 7th century.

Note - A fundamental question is how do the US and moderate Muslim countries counter radical militant Islamic preaching. Militant clerics such as Syrian Imam Mahmoud Quul Aghassi, (Abu Qaqa), or Iraqi Sheik Laith Khalil, are often gifted speakers. They speak of the salvation of heaven through a jihad death. As they cannot offer hope in this world, Khalil assured the jihad martyrs that they are guaranteed a place in heaven and therefore do not need the prayers of others. Aghassi stated that, "Muslims should look to martyrdom as a thirsty man looks to water, we want manhood and heroism. We want people to love death and yearn for heaven." It must be highlighted and published that the senior clerics are not the ones embracing a martyr's death. Do they not wish immediate entrance into paradise?

⁵⁴ There are numerous interpretations of the Qur'an, the document meant to guide the actions of a Muslim. It does address explicitly the law as it relates to personal relationships, manifesting itself in family law. In most other branches of law, western-inspired legal codes have replaced Islamic Law, most notably in Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and even Iran.

⁵⁵ Leon T. Hadar, "Islam: Contrived Threat," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Spring 1993): 27-30.

⁵⁶ Edward Luce, "Teachers of the Taliban," *Financial Times of London*, 17 November 2001; available from ProQuest; accessed 3 January 2004.

⁵⁷ Goodson, 108 –113.

Note -Pakistan has taken steps to counter the growing radical Islamic forces inside their country. The Musarif government outlawed several groups and arrested some leaders, confiscated radical literature and seized bank accounts of the outlawed groups. While these were mostly minor players it was a start.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 161.

⁵⁹ Al-Jazeera. "The Opposite Direction," 22 January 2002. Available from <[http: English. aljazeera. net/NR/exeres/C82E2JA7.html](http://English.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C82E2JA7.html)>. Internet; accessed 14 February 2004.

⁶⁰ Gold, 132.

⁶¹ PBS Inc. "Frontline" available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/textbooks.html>. Internet: accessed 20 February 2004.

⁶² Some of the strengths of the American democracy are our nation's openness and the freedoms that we afford our citizens. The global terrorist attempts to turn our strengths into vulnerabilities by easily entering and remaining undetected in our country. If apprehended, they use all the rights and privileges that our legal system affords. We must guard and balance against losing our rights in pursuit of security. Achieving this balance presents a challenge for

our law enforcement and legal communities, the fact that we afford the suspected terrorist these rights is a strength that we should use in the informational effort in the GWOT. This is using our strength against their weakness

⁶³ John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, "Weapons of Mass Deception," *Salon.com*, 23 September 2003, 1. Stauber commented that propaganda is sometimes successful at deceiving people, but often times it is much less successful at influencing its target population than it is at helping the propaganda team deceive themselves.

There have been several articles written about the concern that the United States is currently suffering loss of credibility and influence with governments and people around the world. This includes the perception that the U.S. is an ally of convenience. While the policy issue at hand is the war on terrorism, not action against Iraq, U.S. actions have linked the two, to the detriment of the GWOT. Many claims about Iraq's weapons programs are not being imprinted negatively on the section of the Muslim world that could become an ally. This maybe because we misperceived our ability to diplomatically influence the skeptical, or perhaps because we believed our own rhetoric.

David Hoffman, "Islam," *Foreign Affairs*, 81 (March/April 2002): 83-95, writes that intervention in a country that is failing or that has failed must entail attention to the factors that led to the failed status. It must have a long-term view, not an in-out approach, as the residents/citizens of that state have expectations. For this and many other reasons, military action must be the very last option, for it is a blunt tool. Military action is not designed to "win the hearts and minds" of the people of the failed state, but it is designed to defeat opposing military force. Hoffman stated in March 2002, "Winning the hearts and minds of Arab and Muslim populations has quite understandably risen to the top of the Bush Administration's agenda". It is questionable that this assertion is now correct. The actions of the Bush Administration since Spring 2002 have clearly damaged any strategic objective aimed at winning the Arab and Muslim population. While military action was necessary to execute the Administration's policy towards regime change in Iraq, it ran counter to efforts of reaching out to moderate Muslims.

The claim of Iraq having reconstituted a nuclear weapons program and could have a nuclear bomb within a year or that Iraq had a centrally controlled chemical weapons program ready to strike have not been supported to date by intelligence or inspection. The message that there is solid proof that Iraq continued to hide development programs both in missile technology and biological agents, and that Iraq consistently violated numerous UN resolutions is lost.

Additionally, the message of pre-emption is that because it is difficult to mount an effective defense against WMD until actual use, a pre-emptive attack against the user of WMD is merely the preservation of a state's right to self-defense. The problem as correctly stated by Anthony Arend and others, is where to draw the line? How does one conclusively prove the criteria of necessity and the proportionality if no attack happened? Israel use of pre-emption in its 1981 attack of the Iraqi Osirak reactor was condemned by international opinion and much of the same world views U.S. action in Iraq the same.

This complicates our message to Islamic moderates. There was a reason why the great majority of Muslim countries condemned the September 11th attacks against the U.S. The Hadiths clearly prohibit the killing of civilians and non-combatants in the course of warfare. The Qur'an states that the taking of one's life unjustly is like taking the life of all humanity and adds

in 2:190, "Fight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not attack them first. God does not love the aggressor." The idea of pre-emption is contrary to Islamic teachings.

⁶⁴ Ralph A. Hallenbeck, *Military as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon- August 1982 –February 1984* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 138.

⁶⁵ The three countries that are major exporters of militant Islamic activity are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. All are autocracies in nature. Each has allowed some measure of democratic freedoms with Pakistan the furthest in the lead. However, liberalized autocracies are not good at economic development and are not receptive to full development of democratic institutions. Quick movement to either economic or democratic development is often destabilizing to the regime. Therefore, a wise approach is a policy of incremental change, not the apparent current policy of applying shocks such as the Iraq War to the region in hopes that a positive war and Iraq nation building would force the autocrats to move forward.

However, regarding radical militant Islam, the incremental approach has its risks. The Islamists have large organizations in the form of mosques, universities and other schools. It is this power base that must be moved to a more moderate position. Currently it is a base from which too many militant Islamists sow seeds of hate, intolerance and violence against all those who do not believe what they believe. They also often act as a wedge between groups seeking a broader pluralism and empowerment approach within their state, and the autocratic regime. It is not surprising that the regime moves towards the more powerful of the two groups – the militant Islamist.

There is hope for the incremental approach. In a January 25, 2004 interview, Adnan Pachachi the president of the Iraqi Governing Council spoke of the understanding between his Council and the most powerful religious figure in Iraq, Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. It was that while Islam is the official religion of the state (a fact repeated throughout the Muslim world) the Quran and Shaira are but one source of law and legislation. Moderate Islamic scholars have for centuries agreed that a state ruler, be it an individual or governing body, had the authority to pass laws. The challenge is in the balance and the US must accept that this balance will never equal the level of individual freedoms that we experience. But those societies would embrace pluralism, freedom of religion, equal rights and rule of law.

Regarding the religious schools, due to their role in indoctrinating and recruiting radical and militant Islamists, a portion of which become terrorists, the US must take action. Cutting the funding is one method, however well funded religious schools will be resistant to U.S. economic power. Pakistan's madrassahs are currently run by private organizations with generous funds from Saudi Arabia. Saudi funding to radical groups must be curtailed.

That said, President Musharraf had continued to test the water of cooperation with the International Community and does so at his own risk. The US must push strongly in the U.N. (as strongly as it did for the war on Iraq) for the International community to support Musharraf's efforts. Economic aid for health and education programs must exist to replace any "education" funding that Saudi Arabia is now providing Pakistan for the spreading of Wahhahism.

⁶⁶ Both the NSS and the NSCT approach of "with us or against us" provide no place for states to be publicly neutral in the currently ill-defined war on terrorism. This strategy approach minimizes the opportunity for publicly neutral countries to work privately with the U.S. to influence reluctant Muslim states and the moderates within all Muslim states. These are the

exact players that the U.S. must address through its informational power in any War of Ideas. Any state publicly aligned with the U.S. will be marginalized due to the “puppet of the U.S.” syndrome. U.S. policy must be to support moderate voices in the Muslim community that are constructively struggling in their own way to create modern democracies with a just and constant rule of law that may, or may not mirror the U.S.

⁶⁷ While the U.S. must clearly take actions to prevent additional terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and associated operatives, the current strategy of focusing on terrorist leadership elimination, a tactical and perhaps operational COG, has meant limited senior U.S. leadership focus on the strategic COG. Individual leaders are important to the setting development and up stage of terrorist groups. However, as shown, some groups like al-Qaeda operate in small groups while the central leadership acts as a clear house. The central leadership elimination is important for planning and coordination disruption, but their removal does not mean the end of the organization, and certainly not the end of the terrorist operations.

Militant terrorists can be broken down into two main groups, the apocalyptic (jihadist) and the pragmatic, and for both of them terrorism is a tool to an end. The pragmatic, which is also the larger group, however can be degraded in effect by the use of U.S. diplomatic, economic, information and military power. They operate on a cost-benefit approach and we must make the cost too high for them. However, the apocalyptic terrorist believes that they are the hand of God, and therefore are willing to die for their beliefs as their hope for the future is not in this world, but in the afterlife.

Additionally, negotiation provides an additional avenue to assess the ends of your enemy, which may give you insight to their ways and means. It does not mean capitulation to their demands. The official U.S. Government position is that it will never negotiate, or even deal with terrorists. This is an idealistic approach that in fact does not reflect reality as the first problem is defining who is a terrorist. The adage of “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” is as true today as it was when the US was dealing with Zionist freedom fighters almost 60 years ago.

⁶⁸ Tazim R. Kassam and Omid Safi, *On Being a Scholar of Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld Publishing, 2003), 131. Thoughtful progressive Muslims such as Kassam are speaking out against moderate Muslim silence. He wrote, “Muslims increasingly recognize that their silence is tantamount to acquiescence and tacit approval of ... immoral and futile acts.

The challenge for the US is to assist in the empowerment of the moderates without destroying their credibility of independence. Also, the level of secularism that we demand in the U.S. may not be the best path in some Muslim countries.

Ahmad Moussalli, *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism; The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999). Islamic thinkers like Ahmad Moussalli believe that a more enlightened but still fundamentalist approach to re-examining Islam can prove fruitful for those seeking to balance modern life, and the classic teachings of the Qur'an. He argues that the Quranic doctrines of Shura (consultation) and Ijma (consensus) demand informed political participation. The reality however is that most of the Muslims that live in failing states do not have the education to navigate their way through the complexity of Islam

The Muslim population is exactly like any other population in that it is full of contradictions. While many Muslims dislike some U.S. actions, they thirst for many ideas and products that represent Western life, freedom of choice in speech, education, and consumer goods. The US should through surrogates influence the madrassas to teach the moderate, tolerant and positive interpretation of the Qur'an identified above.

Additionally, the U.S. can by using its informational power, demonstrate that the Muslim masses that were subjected to militant Islam often rejected it. Efforts to establish an "Islamic State" have in large been a failure. A large portion of Afghanistan people supported the overthrow of the Taliban; in the Sudan hard-line Islamist Hassan-al-Turabi was deposed, and it is now turning towards the West; in Egypt and Algeria (Islamic Salvation Front) extreme Islamic approaches never gained support of the middle class and failed. Attempts to use Islam in the Bosnian War failed to garner mass support throughout the world and Pakistan remains firmly secular despite great efforts by extreme Islamic proponents.

Esposito, John L. *Islam: The Straight Path*. Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press, 1991. A relative success story close to home is the Nation of Islam. The Nation of Islam was born in the ghettos of Detroit during the Great Depression, among the poverty and hopelessness. Radicalizing logical Islam proved useful and the hate that was produced almost rivaled Al-Queda. It spoke of separatism from the White America Devils. However, in the early 1980's, advances in black civil rights and economic status turned the Nation of Islam around. The leader, Imam W. Deen Mohammed, the son of the Nation's founder called for the end of Black Nationalism and embracement of American citizenship.

U.S. money must be applied to moderate teachers of Islam. The U.S. through diplomatic and economic methods should pursue a mixed approach towards these schools. Those schools that the host country is willing to shut down, we should support that action. We can support a moderate state in its efforts to fund schools that have a mixture of religious, technical and secular studies. Egypt and Jordan have had successes in this approach. The US has a national security interest in neutralizing the activities of militant Islamic madrassahs in Pakistan, but also the Middle East, the South East, and here in the U.S. U.S. funding through the growing American Muslim community and moderate programs in Turkey and particularly India would counter the Wahhabi influence.

⁶⁹ A September 2003 poll by the Washington Post found that 69% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and that 50% of Americans thought some of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqis. This is despite the President finally stating also in September 2003 that, neither the FBI, or the CIA have any evidence that Hussein or his regime were involved.

It was noted that Bush administration officials talked about Hussein and bin Laden in the same light, interchangeable and often in the same sentence, this despite the fact that most of the world saw little connection between the two men. Also Vice President Chaney stated in a September 14, 2003 interview on "Meet the Press" that Iraq was "the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for years, but most especially on September 11, 2001.

⁷⁰ As long as war has been waged, information has been key. The integrated approach to gaining and maintaining the information the war fighter requires for fighting and winning, while denying that same kind of information to adversaries, is called information operations. The informational aspect of this war on terrorism will need to be persuasive, pervasive, and long

term. The military has shown that it can operate a very successful Psyops program as evidenced by the “go home/stay at home campaign” during the war in Iraq. However, the war with Iraq has also complicated the effort to combat terrorism, and greatly shapes the US informational campaign against terrorism. The complexity covers the reasons for going to war at that time and the effects of a US occupation in Iraq will have a militant Islamic recruitment.

⁷¹ Washington Post Staff, “Confusion Marks Prisoner Release Outside Baghdad,” *Washington Post*, 9 January 2004, p. 12. The article covers at length how the January 2004 release of prisoners in Baghdad is an example of how not to execute a pro-American information campaign. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) announced a major prisoner release program for Iraqis who “had made a mistake” by supporting the Hussein regime but who did not have “blood stained bands.” The released number of prisoners would be approximately 500 of the 9000 held. The first 100 released on that Thursday of those to be released was forthcoming relatives of thousands of prisoners arrived at the prison to see if their relative was being released. The result of course is that the hundreds or the thousands that waited at the prison would be disappointed. As the crowd waited, a military convoy with an open truck full of prisoners with hoods over their heads passed through the crowd. Hoods for operational security is fine, but an open truck and the timing are examples of lack of public relations concepts, which act to counter all the other excellent work being done.

Relatives told of a man known by the entire village of having a shop, which sold balloons to children. He and his sons were arrested for bomb making when US troops found helium in his shop. No one from the US government or the CPA has come to ask about the man’s, his son’s activities or about the man’s shop and its history since their arrest weeks prior. The relatives ask where was this man’s “mistake” in supporting Hussein. The CPA must acknowledge when mistakes were also made by coalition forces in order to show their own humanity. Additionally, only 66 prisoners were released that day and that was done approximately one mile down the road from the prison. Probably and rightly, for crowd control purposes, but a better-executed release could have forestalled such a process.

⁷² Fouad Ajami, “What the Muslim World is Watching,” *The New York Times Magazine*, 8 November 2001, 48-54, stated that the expansion of media access, specifically independent native outlets will spur competition. That competition thrives on seeking out views that contradict or contrast their competitors, often especially if the dominant outlet may be government controlled or a dominant force in the area like Al Jazeera. The U.S. can help ensure that the necessary expertise and equipment are afforded these new outlets to aid in their survival. The U.S. Government should however not sponsor any station until the others are functioning as any U.S. sponsored station will be viewed as mere propaganda. Once the other stations are online however, the dissemination of U.S. prospective is valuable. The media realize that information coming from the White House Communications Office is biased to the President’s views, but still actively seeks such information in an attempt to “read between the lines.” But the White House gets to influence the agenda. As Fouad Ajami stated, “No matter how hard we try, we cannot beat Al Jazeera at its own game.” So let us change the game or at least the ground rules.

⁷³ Kepel, 136-150, 363-366.

⁷⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Global Jihad* (Falls Church, VA: Sound Room Publishers 2002), 5.

⁷⁵ Progressive Muslim is defined as a Muslim that accepts the themes of social justice, gender justice, and pluralism. At the center of their belief is that Islam holds that every life, Muslim and non-Muslim, has the same intrinsic worth. Additionally a progressive Muslim engages the serious tradition of Islamic thought and practice. Only through this engagement of Islamic thought can one declare that existing interpretations are lacking. This process of engagement places the progressive Muslim apart from a Muslim that is secular in nature due to their secular education or experiences.

⁷⁶ This does not diminish the clear need to address the myriad of long and short term issues of terrorism in a non-linear manner, but it does suggest that if one does not identify correctly the center of gravity of one's opponent, the efforts expended will be less effective and possibly irrelevant.

GLOSSARY

My effort to organize the wide differences in terms that were encountered during my research.

Defensive jihad	- discussed in the Qur'an and permitted for the defensive of Muslims in need. The Qur'an outlines extensive and strict rules for military action in a jihad. Protection to innocents is prominent.
Hadiths	- the narration about the life of the Prophet Muhammad.
Islamist movement	- the politicalization of Islam requiring that political actors not only consult with religious authorities, but that religious authorities should be the final approval.
Islamic Muslim.	– a Muslim whose daily life and activities are ruled by the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet Muhammad). A fair comparison in the West would be a fundamentalist Christian. Opposite of U.S. belief of church state separation
Jihad	- literally translated as a struggle. Means a personal inner struggle for improvement by the vast majority of Muslims. Used by jihadists to mean holy war and as a justification of violence against non – Muslims.
Jihadist	- a radical militant Islamist that believes Modern day Kharajtes.
Kharajtes	- a puritan sect left the Islamic mainstream in the 7 th century and elevated violent jihad against non-Muslims to a sixth pillar of Islam.
Radical militant Islamist	- one whose interpretation of the teachings of Islam requires the separation of themselves from Jews and Crusaders (Christians) who are non-believers and therefore enemies. They are to resist with force if necessary the influence of non-believers. Jihadists are an outgrowth of this grouping. A segment of the Salafis fall into this grouping, – the Deobandi movement however does not advocate violence against non-believers.
Salafi	- literally translated to be a companion of Muhammad. Used by Islamists to mean the only true followers of the teachings of Muhammad. Considered a puritan (no alterations to the religion – meaning no development to deal with modern society only use of ancient text.) sect of Islamic. The Wahhabi (Saudi Arabia based) and Deobandi sects are the largest. The Taliban would be an example of this grouping. Strict Islamic Muslims.
Wahhabism	- a militant doctrinal interpretation of Islam founded in Saudi Arabia. Its followers are a puritan sect in the Islamic movement that is Salafi based. Violence against non-believers is accepted as permitted under the will of Allah.

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